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ABSTRACT 
Through the “Act to Strengthen the Non-financial Reporting by Corporations 
in their Management and Group Management Reports” (Gesetz zur Stärkung der 
nichtfinanziellen Berichterstattung der Unternehmen in ihren Lage- und Konzernlageber-
ichten) (CSR Directive Transposition Act, CSR-RUG) of 11 April 20171, the 
German Bundestag implemented Directive 2014/95/EU (“CSR Directive”)2 
into German law. Following the European impetus, the CSR-RUG enriches 
the traditional repertoire of forms of action under environmental law by a fur-
ther instrument. Already the regulatory context gives an idea of its atypical na-
ture: The centrepiece of the CSR-RUG is the amendment of and addition to 
the Third Book of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, “HGB”), 
which deals with the “trading books” of undertakings, i.e., accounting and re-
porting requirements. Since the reporting year 2017, large capital market-
oriented corporations must report extensively within the framework of their 
annual management reports on their activities and effects in certain areas of 
“Corporate Social Responsibility”. This also includes environmental matters. 
The transparency and publicity this entails is intended to generate positive 
stimuli for more responsible, sustained and not least of all environmentally 
friendly entrepreneurial action. Following a brief presentation of the European 
legal bases and their implementation in Germany (1.), we will classify the pro-
visions within the underlying concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (2.) 
and analyse and systemise the governance effects of non-financial reporting 
(3.). A few remarks on selected aspects of the chosen approach and its imple-
mentation (4.) as well as an outlook summarising our conclusions (5.) will 
                                                          
1 Federal Law Gazette, Part I 2017, 802 et seq. 
2 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 22 October 
2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity in-
formation by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ EU No. L 330, p. 1. 
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complete this article. By detailing the German approach to transposing the 
CSR Directive, this paper intends to provide an example of the challenges 
member state legislators face when complying with modern governance con-
cepts such as Corporate Social Responsibility by way of non-financial reporting 
obligations. 
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1. Subject Matter and Content of non-Financial Reporting  
 
1. 1. Background in European law  
 
The initiative to achieve ecological, social and other non-commercial 
goals by way of corporate reporting originated in Brussels. The Commission 
announced by way of a Communication in the year 2011 that it intended to 
strengthen the social responsibility of undertakings3. As the method of choice, 
it identified among others the disclosure of social and ecological information 
on the business activities of large undertakings4.  
A prominent result of this programmatic goal is the CSR Directive5. The 
CSR Directive amends Directive 2013/34/EU (“Accounting Directive”)6 and 
                                                          
3 Communication of the Commission of 25 October 2011, A new EU Strategy 2011-
2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), COM(2011) 681 final. 
4 Communication of the Commission of 25 October 2011, A new EU Strategy 2011-
2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), COM(2011) 681 final, p. 14. 
5 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity in-
formation by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ EU No. L 330, p. 1. 
6 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports 
of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament 
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requires the member states to expand existing reporting duties of large under-
takings by «a non-financial statement containing information […], necessary for an under-
standing of the undertaking’s development, performance, position and impact of its activity, 
relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human 
rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters» (art. 19a Accounting Directive). What is 
to be understood by this in view of environmental issues is explained in Recital 
7 CSR Directive: 
«Where undertakings are required to prepare a non-financial statement, that state-
ment should contain, as regards environmental matters, details of the current and foreseeable 
impacts of the undertaking’s operations on the environment and, as appropriate, health and 
safety, the use of renewable and/or non-renewable energy, green-house gas emissions, water use 
and air pollution».  
With a view to the “relevant, useful and comparable disclosure of non-
financial information by undertakings”, the Commission published non-
binding guidelines in accordance with art. 2 CSR Directive to further the prac-
tical implementation of the new reporting duties (“CSR Guidelines”)7. 
 
 
1.2. Implementation by the CSR-RUG 
 
The detailed provisions of the CSR Directive leave only little leeway for 
the member states’ transposition into national law. Thus, the new secs. 289b to 
289e as well as secs. 315b to 315d HGB, implementing the non-financial re-
porting duties into the German commercial and corporate law, largely consti-
tute an “identical” transposition which may serve to exemplify the goals and 
mechanisms of the CSR Directive:8 
a) Undertakings subject to the obligations 
The extended reporting duties, which apply for the first time to fiscal 
years beginning after 31 December 2016, are limited according to 
sec. 289b para. 1 HGB to corporations, cooperatives as well as limited liability 
commercial partnerships within the meaning of sec. 264a HGB, which cumula-
                                                                                                                                                    
and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, OJ EU 
No. L 182, p. 19. 
7 Communication of the Commission of 5 July 2017, Guidelines on non-financial re-
porting (methodology for reporting non-financial information), OJ EU No. C 215, p. 1); see in 
more detail Mock, Der Betrieb 2017, 2144 et seq. 
8 Regarding the deviations of certain points from the minimum standards of the Di-
rective as well as the following on the whole, see Kajüter, Der Betrieb 2017, 617 et seq.; Seibt, 
Der Betrieb 2016, 2707 et seq. 
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tively (i) qualify as “large” within the meaning of sec. 267 para. 3 sentence 1 
HGB (i.e. fulfil at least two of the following criteria: balance-sheet sum of € 
20,000,000, annual sales of € 40,000,000, on annual average 250 employees), 
(ii) are capital market-oriented within the meaning of sec. 264d HGB (use of an 
organized market for their own securities), (iii) and employ more than 
500 people on average per year. Large credit institutions and insurance compa-
nies are obliged to perform non-financial reporting regardless of their capital 
market orientation9. At the beginning of the year 2018, 522 German corpora-
tions were obliged to report, more than half of which being banks and insur-
ance companies10.  
The German legislator refrained from extending the scope of application 
of the reporting duty beyond the CSR Directive to corporations below these 
thresholds in order to spare small and medium-sized enterprises the additional 
administrative and financial burdens imposed by the reporting duty11.  
Consistent with the systematic structure of the HGB, secs. 289b et seq. 
HGB apply only to the (individual) management report of a corporation. Sec-
tions 315b et seq. HGB transfer the duties to the group management reports 
of parent companies. Section 289b para. 2 HGB therefore exempts subsidiaries 
which are included in the group management report of the parent company12. 
b) Form and subject matter of the reporting duty. 
Non-financial reporting relates within the regulatory system and formally 
to the management report, which constitutes a separate reporting instrument 
apart from the annual financial statements (sec. 264 HGB). The management 
report contains information on the course of business as well as the expected 
developments, including significant opportunities and risks (sec. 289 HGB)13. 
                                                          
9 Kirsch, in: Hofbauer/Kupsch (eds.), Rechnungslegung, 89. Akt. 2018, § 289b rec.  16 et 
seq.; Lerchenmüller, in: Beck’scher Onlinekommentar HGB, Häublein/Hoffmann/Theinert, 
19th ed. 2018, § 289b, rec. 6. 
10 Börsen-Zeitung No. 63 of 20 March 2018, p. 1. 
11 As stated in the reasons for the government draft, Parliamentary Document 18/9982, 
p. 44; regarding the relevance of the CSR for small and medium-sized enterprises, see Fisch-
er/Neubeck, in: HGB-Jahresabschluss, 14th ed. 2018, TEIL 1 Systematischer Wegweiser, 
rec. 263. 
12 The requirements of secs. 315b et seq. HGB correspond to those in secs. 289b et 
seq. HGB, so that the following will for reasons of readability refer only to the (individual) 
management report and the respective provisions. The same applies to art. 19a and 29a Ac-
counting Directive. Unless expressly stated otherwise, the explanations apply likewise to the 
group management report. The term “corporation” refers in the following both to an individu-
al company obliged to report and to a group obliged to report. 
13 Regarding the functions of the management report in general, see Tesch, 
Nichtfinanzielle Leistungsindikatoren im Lagebericht, in: Freidank/Müller/Wulf (eds.), 
Controlling und Rechnungslegung, p. 301 (302). 
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Corporations affected by the CSR-RUG can either “scatter” their “non-
financial statement” (sec. 289c HGB) over the management report, assigned 
according to topic, or bundle it in a separate section. According to sec. 289b 
para. 3 No. 2 HGB an entirely separate “non-financial report” is also admissi-
ble, provided it is published together with the management report in the Fed-
eral Gazette (sec. 325 HGB) or on the website of the company within four 
months of the balance sheet date, and the management report refers to it14. 
The non-financial statement must, according to sec. 289c para. 2 HGB, 
contain information at least on the following five topics: environmental, em-
ployee and social issues, respect for human rights, and anti-corruption issues. 
To more precisely specify the environmental aspects of relevance in the state-
ment, sec. 289c para. 2 No. 1 HGB refers by way of example to the items 
named in Recital 7 CSR Directive quoted above (green-house gas emissions, 
water use, air pollution, the use of energy, biological diversity)15. The CSR 
Guidelines further extend the catalogue of possible environmental goals: mate-
rial disclosures on pollution prevention and control; environmental impact 
from energy use; direct and indirect atmospheric emissions; use and protection 
of natural resources (e.g. water, land); waste management; environmental im-
pacts from transportation or from the use and disposal of products and ser-
vices; development of green products and services16. 
c) Required disclosures 
The necessary content of the non-financial declaration is determined by 
sec. 289c para. 3 HGB. According to this provision, information is to be dis-
closed on the aspects named in para. 2 which — in accordance with art. 19a 
Accounting Directive as amended by the CSR Directive — fulfil a two-tier rel-
evance criterion, (i) mainly those necessary to understand the course of busi-
ness, the business results or the situation of the company as well as (ii) to under-
stand the effects on the non-financial aspects. In detail, a non-exhaustive (“"in-
cluding”) list names the following: 
1. description of the policies pursued by the corporation and due 
diligence processes implemented, 
2. outcome of those policies, 
3. the principal risks related to those matters of the corporation’s 
                                                          
14 In detail Mock, in: Hachmeister/Kahle/Mock/Schüppen (eds..), Bilanzrecht, § 289b, 
rec. 53 et seq. 
15 The German legislator names in the reasons for the law the aspects of health, envi-
ronmental safety, ground pollution as well as the global environmental and climate goals, Par-
liamentary Document 18/9982, p. 47. 
16 CSR Guidelines, point 4.6. 
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operations which are likely to cause adverse impacts on the non-financial as-
pects named in para. 2, and how the corporation manages these risks, 
4. the principal risks linked to the corporation’s operations, its 
products and services which are very likely to cause adverse impacts on the as-
pects named in para. 2, insofar as the information is significant and the report-
ing on these risks is proportionate, and how the corporation manages those 
risks, 
5. the most significant non-financial performance indicators rele-
vant to the business activities, 
6. references to and explanations of amounts reported in the an-
nual financial statements, to the extent necessary to understand. 
Sec. 289d HGB provides that corporations required to report may be 
guided entirely or partly by already existing “frameworks” for voluntary self-
commitment when drafting the non-financial statement17. These could be, for 
example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the GRI G4 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, the European environmental management 
and audit system EMAS or the Global Compact of the United Nations18. The 
corporation must state whether it applied such framework and, if so, why it did 
not do so. The use of a framework, however, does not suspend the duty to dis-
cuss all aspects necessary under sec. 289c para. 3 HGB where these are not 
(completely) covered by the respective framework19. In this case, the non-
financial statement must provide additional information going beyond the 
framework concerned. The CSR Guidelines give examples of environmentally 
relevant “performance indicators” to be taken into consideration: Overall en-
ergy performance and improvements in energy performance; energy consump-
tion from non-renewable sources and energy intensity; green-house gas emis-
sions and emissions of other pollutants; extraction of natural resources; im-
pacts and dependences on natural capital and biodiversity; waste manage-
ment20. 
The mandatory content of the non-financial statement reveals a hybrid 
nature already laid out in the CSR Directive: On the one hand, the non-
financial statement is not completely independent from the business infor-
mation and accounting function of the reporting system under commercial law. 
                                                          
17 See in detail Paetzmann in: Haufe (ed.), HGB Bilanz Kommentar, 8th ed. 2017, § 
289d, rec. 1 et seq. 
18 See Parliamentary Document 18/9982, p. 52; see also CSR Guidelines, point 1, 19. 
19 Parliamentary Document 18/9982, p. 52 et seq.; for more details concerning EMAS 
see III.2.b) below. 
20 CSR Guidelines, point 4.6. 
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Because of the link to the course of business, the business result or the situa-
tion of the company which follows from sec. 289 para. 3 HGB, impacts on the 
matters outside the company named in sec. 289c para. 2 HGB are only a nec-
essary condition, but not sufficient to trigger the reporting duty. Specifically: If 
business operations have a massive negative impact on environmental aspects, 
but the information about this is not also necessary to understand the course 
of business, the business results or the situation of the company, such infor-
mation need not be included in the non-financial statement, as the unambigu-
ous wording of the law makes clear. However, the reasons for the law point 
out that, given the interaction between the business situation and environmen-
tal impacts, both relevance criteria will typically be fulfilled simultaneously21. 
If that is the case, sec. 289c para. 3 HGB on the other hand triggers a 
comprehensive duty to report which is precisely not limited to directly finan-
cially relevant information but instead—as the non-exhaustive list shows—
requires extensive information on the impacts outside the company on the as-
pects named in sec. 289c para. 2 HGB22. This represents the crucial difference 
from sec. 289 para. 3 HGB, which already required large corporations (sec. 267 
para. 3 HGB) to also include “non-financial performance indicators” in the 
analyses of the course of business and the situation of the company. This ex-
pressly comprises information on environmental aspects, but only if, in spite of 
their “non-financial” nature, they can have a major influence on the financial 
result or the financial status of the corporation concerned23. In contrast, the ex-
tended reporting duty leads to a change of perspective: Whereas the focus so 
far was on the risks for the company arising from the social environment, the 
question now also is what dangers emanate from the business operations to is-
sues outside the company, including environmental issues24. 
                                                          
21 Parliamentary Document 18/9982, p. 49; see also IV.3. below with regard to the link 
to the course of business, the business results or the situation of the company. 
22 In depth Winkeljohann/Schäfer in: Grottel et al. (eds.), Beck'scher Bilanz-Kommentar, 
11th ed. 2018, § 289c, rec. 30 et seq. 
23Lange, in: Münchener Kommentar HGB, 3rd ed. 2013, § 289 rec. 129 with further 
references; Schaefer/Schröder, Die Wirtschaftsprüfung 2013, 1084 (1087). In view of environ-
mental issues, this may according to a recommendation of the Commission include the recog-
nition, measurement and disclosure of environmentally caused expenditures, liabilities and risks 
as well as related assets; Recommendation of the Commission of 30 May 2001 on the consid-
eration of environmental aspects in the annual financial statements and the management report 
of undertakings: Recognition, measurement and disclosure, C(2001) 1495, OJ EC No. L 156, 
p. 33. 
24 Cf. Regierer/Beckmann, Börsen-Zeitung vom 7 April 2017, p. 10. Although the per-
formance indicators will in the future also be a part of the non-financial statement according to 
sec. 289c para. 3 No. 5 HGB they will only be one aspect among many.  
204 
 
Section 289c para. 4 HGB adds a duty to explain to the mandatory in-
formation: If a corporation pursues no “policy” in relation to one or several 
reportable matters, it must explain this “clearly and with reasons”25. A similar 
comply-or-explain mechanism is already known from art. 20 Accounting Directive 
and in Germany, for example, the German Corporate Governance Code 
(sec. 161 German Stock Corporation Act, Aktiengesetz).  
Finally, a “protective clause”26 is contained in sec. 289e para. 1 HGB. To 
avert a “substantial disadvantage”, corporations may refrain from disclosing 
information required in principle to be disclosed, provided certain extraordi-
nary conditions are fulfilled. It is a prerequisite that these are future develop-
ments or issues in respect of which “negotiations are being conducted”. This 
narrow exception27 is apparently intended to avoid negotiation processes of ex-
istential significance to the company being undermined by the reporting duty. 
As soon as the danger of a substantial disadvantage no longer exists, the sup-
pressed information is to be included in the following non-financial statement 
(sec. 289e para. 2 HGB). Whether this provision will have any practical signifi-
cance is yet to be seen. 
d) Audit and sanctions 
The traditional management report within the meaning of sec. 289 HGB 
must be audited by the certified auditor in particular as to whether it is con-
sistent with the annual financial statements as well as the findings made in the 
audit and on the whole accurately presents the situation of the corporation. 
Sec. 317 para. 2 sentence 4 HGB extends the audit duty to the non-financial 
information, but only to a limited extent: The auditor must determine the for-
mally accurate presentation of a non-financial statement or, as the case may be, 
a separate non-financial report together with the management report28. The 
German legislator refrained in this respect from exercising a right to choose, 
contained in the CSR Directive, to also require a substantive audit of the con-
tents of the non-financial statement (art. 19a para. 6 Accounting Directive). 
                                                          
25 In contrast, according to the reasons given for the law, the absence of a “due dili-
gence process”, which is also named in sec. 289c para. 3 No. 1 HGB, does not suffice to trig-
ger the duty to explain, provided the company required to report does have a policy, Parlia-
mentary Document 18/9982, p. 52. 
26 Winkeljohann/Schäfer in: Grottel et al. (eds.), Beck'scher Bilanz-Kommentar, 11th ed. 
2018, § 289e, rec. 1; Kajüter, Der Betrieb 2017, 617 (623). 
27 Parliamentary Document 18/9982, p. 53. 
28 Regarding the scope of the auditor’s competence: Mehring/Hartke/Pieper, Die 
Wirtschaftsprüfung 2018, 494 (494 et seq.); Seidler, Der Betriebsberater 2018, 1067; Kälberer, 
Zeitschrift für Bilanzierung, Rechnungswesen und Controlling 2018, 194 (198) with further 
references.   
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However, if a company required to report voluntarily includes the non-
financial information in the substantive audit, the audit results must also be 
published in accordance with sec. 289 para. 4 HGB29. 
There is, however, an interrelation between this apparent relief and the 
auditing duty of the Supervisory Board according to sec. 171 AktG, which now 
expressly extends to the non-financial parts of the report. Whereas the Super-
visory Board may in principle rely on the auditor’s audit opinion in view of the 
annual financial statements30, this possibility does not exist for the unaudited 
non-financial information. Sec. 111 para. 2 AktG therefore gives the Supervi-
sory Board the authority to commission an additional substantive audit of the 
non-financial disclosures. In view of the severe criminal and administrative 
sanctions in case of untrue reporting (sec. 331 et seq. HGB)31, this right should 
be widely used. 
 
 
2. Background: Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Pro-
tection 
 
2. 1. Idea of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The introduction of non-financial reporting duties is a cornerstone of the 
strategy forcefully pursued at the European level to induce undertakings to act 
“responsibly”. Although the notion of Corporate Social Responsibility increas-
ingly enters the stage in the (economic) policy and legal debate, a generally ac-
cepted definition has not emerged32. And this may well not be necessary at all: 
It is a concept more than a distinctive and subsumable legal term33. In its 
Communication from the year 2011 already mentioned above, the Commission 
describes Corporate Social Responsibility as “the responsibility of enterprises 
                                                          
29 The duty to publish applies according to art. 2, 4 CRS-RUG for the first time to 
statements regarding fiscal years beginning after 31 December 2018, see for this the report of 
the Committee for Law and Consumer Protection, Parliamentary Document 18/11450, p. 50.  
30 See only Hoffmann-Becking, in Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts, Vol. 4, 
4th ed. 2015, § 45 rec. 15 with further references.  
31 For details, see Seibt, Der Betrieb 2016, 2707 (2714). 
32Schneider, in: Schneider/Schmidpeter (eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Verantwortungsvolle Unternehmensführung in Theorie und Praxis, 2nd ed. 2015, p. 21 (23). 
33 Illustrative Klene, Wertpapiermitteilungen (Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht) 
2018, 308. 
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for their impacts on society”34 and thus provides a suitable starting point (if en-
vironmental issues in an anthropocentric sense are understood also as a “so-
cial” issue). That the keyword (“impacts”) reappears in the central provisions 
of the CSR Directive and the CSR-RUG is hardly surprising before this back-
drop. 
There is agreement that an enterprise which is “responsible” within the 
meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility will not be guided in its actions ex-
clusively by profit maximization but will instead also be aware of the conse-
quences of its business operations for matters of public interest and for parties 
frequently referred to as “stakeholders” (shareholders, employees, customers, 
investors etc.) and will consider these in its business decisions35. The undertak-
ing is viewed as an actor integrated in civil society not only with legal commit-
ments but also social ones36. 
What goes with this is that behavioural rules for Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility are basically legally non-binding; the concept is not an originally 
legal one, but has its origins in the social, communications and economic sci-
ences37. Especially responsible entrepreneurial action goes by definition beyond 
the fulfilment of the legal “minimum standard”: Anyone who merely complies 
with the requirements of a permit to operate a plant under emission control 
law cannot claim to have any special sense of responsibility, but at best to be in 
compliance38. In contrast, the installation of an additional pollutant filter which 
is not legally required can demonstrate actually practiced Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility. All the same, “juridification tendencies” are apparent, in particular 
induced at the European level with the CSR Directive being a prime example39. 
                                                          
34 Communication of the Commission of 25 October 2011, A new EU strategy 2011-
2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility of the undertakings (CSR), COM(2011) 681 final, p. 6 
(emphasis added). 
35 Green Paper of the European Commission of 18 July 2001, Promoting a European 
framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2001) 366 final, para. 24; Kirsch, in: 
Hofbauer/Kupsch (eds.), Rechnungslegung, 89. Akt. 2018, § 289b rec. 1; Schneider, in: 
Schneider/Schmidpeter (eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility. Verantwortungsvolle Un-
ternehmensführung in Theorie und Praxis, 2nd ed. 2015, p. 21 (24). 
36 This is intended to be expressed by the also very common term of “Good Corporate 
Citizenship“, cf. Spießhofer, in: Hauschka/Moosmayer/Lösler (eds.), Corporate Compliance, 3rd 
ed. 2016, § 11 rec. 1 et seq. 
37 Grützner/Jakob, in: Grützner/Jakob (eds.), Compliance von A-Z, 2nd ed., 2015, 
Stichwort: „Corporate Social Responsibility“; Klene, Wertpapiermitteilungen (Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht) 7/2018, 308. 
38 For the relationship between Compliance and Corporate Social Responsibility see: 
Spießhofer, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 2018, 441 (442 et seq.). 
39Schneider, in: idem/Schmidpeter (ed.), Corporate Social Responsibility. Verantwor-
tungsvolle Unternehmensführung in Theorie und Praxis, 2nd ed. 2015, p. 21 (24 et seq.); 
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But, as will be shown in more detail later, the substantive requirements of Cor-
porate Social Responsibility remain of a non-binding, persuasive nature40. 
 
2. 2. Environmental Protection as a Central Concern of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
The protection of the environment was and is one of the central con-
cerns and fields of application of Corporate Social Responsibility41. The call for 
responsible action is particularly obvious where “hard” external restrictions 
through legislation or market rules do not lead to optimal results. The con-
sumption of natural resources for the purposes of entrepreneurial activity 
causes economically negative externalities42. The costs involved in this are 
borne (partly) by the general public and are not (fully) reflected in the price 
paid by the customers of a company for its goods or services. Price mecha-
nisms fail in this respect as a limiting factor.  
Without state intervention, such a market failure threatens to result in 
the overexploitation of natural resources43. The spectrum of legal measures for 
the protection of the environment and the volume of environmental laws, 
which has been growing inexorably for decades, are accordingly vast. The es-
tablished instruments of environmental law reach from regulatory prohibitions 
to informal agreements44. But legally binding requirements of environmental 
law are always the result of a political compromise between environmental pro-
tection and free (economic) development, and the legal expression of a weigh-
ing of conflicting positions based on fundamental rights, which must be bal-
anced by the legislator and the executive. On a case-by-case basis this poten-
tially allows great scope for the reduction of environmental pollution through 
entrepreneurial action. This is the point where environmentally conscious Cor-
porate Social Responsibility begins.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Spießhofer, in: Hauschka/Moosmayer/Lösler (eds.), Corporate Compliance, 3rd ed. 2016, § 11 
rec. 2 et seq.; a “gradual” changing of the law through Corporate Social Responsibility is attest-
ed by Altemeier, Anwaltsblatt 2015, 950 (950). 
40 See III. below. 
41 See for example the empirical analysis by Zülch/Kretzmann, Der Betrieb 2016, 677 
(680). 
42 See for example Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 
5th ed. 2013, p. 81, 594 et seq. Regarding the connection between external effects and Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility, see also Schreyögg, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2009, 757 (762). 
43 Fundamentally: Hardin, Science 162 [1968], p. 1243 et seq. (“tragedy of the com-
mons”). 
44 Details in II.2 below. 
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This applies, in particular, to international companies and groups which 
operate also in countries and regions where far less rigorous environmental 
standards apply than in Europe. To counteract the deficits founded in this, ap-
peals have been made to undertakings already for some time to consider envi-
ronmental and social issues throughout the world to a special extent going be-
yond their obligations and to impose respective obligations upon their business 
partners. A well-known example is the Global Compact of the United Nations 
from the year 1999 which companies can accede to in order to commit to pro-
tective and preventive environmental standards, among other things. This tra-
dition is continued by the CSR Directive and the CSR-RUG by according a 
prominent role to environmental issues45. 
 
3. Non-financial Reporting Duties as a Novel Governance Instrument of 
Environmental Law 
 
3. 1. (Desired) Effect of non-Financial Reporting Duties 
 
By incorporating environmental and social issues into the annual man-
agement reports of large capital market-oriented corporations, the European 
Union pursues an ambitious goal: It is said to be no less than a disclosure duty 
that is «vital for managing change towards a sustainable global economy by combining long-
term profitability with social justice and environmental protection»46. Measured by this, 
the novelties practically hidden in the German Commercial Code from the per-
spective of environmental law appear quite nondescript. Accordingly, their 
mode of action is rather subtle: 
a) Indirect influence through information 
The starting point of the Directive and the transposing law is the realisa-
tion that consumers, investors and other “stakeholders” of an undertaking 
consider not only the “hard” corporate key figures when taking consumption 
and investment decisions, but increasingly also “soft” non-financial factors, 
more particularly the environmental impacts of an undertaking47. Already in the 
year 2001, in a Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility, the Commis-
sion developed the triple bottom line concept according to which «the overall per-
formance of a company should be measured based on its combined contribution to economic 
                                                          
45 See I.2. above. 
46 Recital 3 CSR Directive. 
47 Recital 3 CSR Directive; Parliamentary Document. 18/9982, p. 1. 
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prosperity, environmental quality and social capital»48. Investors, too, increasingly de-
termine the “true” value of an undertaking in a combination of financial and 
non-financial factors49. 
This development is the expression of an evolving environmental aware-
ness and explains why many large undertakings already today publish voluntary 
“sustainability reports” or similar statements on ecological and social issues, in 
addition to the obligatory financial reports50. These undertakings frequently 
commit to the observance of the frameworks referred to as guidance in art. 19a 
para. 1 subpara. 5 Accounting Directive and sec. 289d HGB51. But the necessi-
ty or meaningfulness of a legal obligation to provide non-financial reports is 
not yet explained by this. If customers and investors in any case demand in-
formation on Corporate Social Responsibility and base their commercial deci-
sions on that, undertakings would be forced already by the laws of the market 
to meet these demands and to use their Corporate Social Responsibility as a 
«value added instrument»52. Apparently both the European and the German legis-
lator see a further need to catch up here. 
For this, they chose the path via form to content: The CSR Directive and 
the transposing laws of the member states do not create any substantive envi-
ronmental obligations. The undertakings being addressed are not forced to ad-
just their environmentally relevant business activities, but are only indirectly 
induced to do so: Anybody would hesitate greatly to attest “serious negative 
impacts” on the environment from one’s own business. But sec. 289c para. 3 
No. 3 HGB now requires this to be done if it is objectively the case and the 
relevance thresholds are exceeded53. Undertakings will make strenuous ef-
forts—this is at least the apparent belief of the Union and national legisla-
                                                          
48 Green Paper of the European Commission of 18 July 2001, Promoting a European 
framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2001) 366 final, p. 30; see also Fleischer, 
in: Hommelhof/Hopt/Werder (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2nd ed., 2009, 185 
(205); Velte, Zeitschrift für Internationale Rechnungslegung 2017, 325 (325 et seq.) with further 
references. 
49 Empirical study by Gutsche/Gratwohl/Fauser, Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Rechnungslegung 2015, 455 et seq. as well as Gutsche/Gratwohl/Schulz, Zeitschrift für 
Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht 2017, 332 (345). 
50 Communication of the European Commission of 25 October 2011, a new EU strate-
gy 2011-2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility COM(2011) 681 final, p. 14; See for example 
the report “Unternehmerische Verantwortung Bericht 2016” of Deutsche Bank AG, available 
at https://cr-bericht.db.com/2016/de/index.html (last accessed on 11 May 2018). 
51 See I.2.c) above; specifically for EMAS certification also III.2.b) below. 
52 Zülch/Kretzmann, Der Betrieb 2016, 677 (681). 
53 Necessity in order to understand the course of business, the business results or the 
situation of the company as well as the impacts on environmental and social issues (sec. 289c 
para. 3 HGB); see I.2.c) above. 
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tors—to avoid such self-denunciation. Even stakeholders who have so far not 
focused on the aspects of Corporate Social Responsibility will possibly turn 
away from a company if negative side effects of its business activities become 
evident in this way. Some investors are even (self-)committed to participate on-
ly in corporations with sustainable business operations54. 
This indirect effect puts a price tag on inadequate Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility which management must take into account in taking business deci-
sions. Efforts to protect the environment which prevent a disadvantageous 
non-financial statement thereby become comparatively advantageous and thus 
easier to justify as an entrepreneurial measure. Through this—actual or even 
only anticipated—reaction of third parties to the non-financial reports, they 
become an information and market based governance instrument. 
This effect is reinforced—at least in the legislator’s intention55—by the 
comply-or-explain mechanism in sec. 289c para. 4 HGB, according to which cor-
porations required to report must explain if and why they do not pursue any 
“policy” in view of environmental and other aspects of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility56. Again, the HGB imposes no obligation to implement such poli-
cies. But surely no company will want to suffer the ignominy of declaring that 
it has no “policy” for its actions in relation to environmental and social issues. 
In view of the criminal and administrative sanctions in secs. 331 et seq. HGB, 
the untruthful failure to disclose reportable environmental impacts or claiming 
to have an environmental policy that in actual fact does not exist is in any case 
not viable in the long term. 
b) Dynamisation through periodisation  
In addition, there is the periodicity of corporate reporting, which invites 
a comparison between reporting periods. As in the case of the annual financial 
statements, the stakeholders will typically want to observe a positive develop-
ment compared to the previous year’s report. Corporations required to report 
are therefore compelled to improve not only their business results but also 
their “environmental balance sheet” compared to the previous year by remov-
ing liabilities and reporting new initiatives and successes. In this way, the re-
                                                          
54 A prominent example is the Norwegian state pension fund, which is obliged under 
the guidelines of the Norwegian Finance Ministry to give up participations in case (among oth-
ers) of serious environmental damage due to the investment object; the English version of the 
guidelines is available at 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/7c9a364d2d1c474f8220965065695a4a/guidelines_
observation_exclusion2016.pdf  (last accessed on 11 May 2018). 
55 Regarding the possibly limited effectivity see IV.2 below. 
56 See I.2.c) above. 
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porting duty can generate a continuously dynamic process for the realisation of 
environmentally and socially comparable entrepreneurship57. 
c) Indirect extraterritorial effect 
For undertakings that operate internationally, which is typically the case 
for the “large” and “capital market-oriented” companies and groups required 
to report, the reporting duty can additionally lead to an extraterritorial radiating 
effect of European social and environmental standards58. Whereas the reach of 
substantive legal requirements generally ends at the national borders because of 
the principle of territoriality in public international law59, the undertakings re-
quired to report are also obliged to accurately describe the environmental con-
sequences of their business activities in third countries, including the chain of 
supply (to the extent reasonable). Whatever may be admissible under local en-
vironmental law can at the same time constitute a reportable “serious negative 
effect” within the meaning of sec. 289c para. 3 no. 3 HGB. To avoid this 
statement a corporation affected by this must “export” the European stand-
ards. 
If the legislative expectations are fulfilled, the CSR Directive will lead 
through the backdoor of commercial law to a higher degree of responsible 
business management, not least of all with regard to environmental issues.  
 
 
3. 2. Inclusion in the Instrumental Systematics of Environmental Law 
 
The legislator and the administration permanently face a regulatory or in-
strumental choice60. For the achievement of a constitutionally, legally and/or polit-
ically determined goal, a virtually unlimited number of regulatory and enforce-
ment mechanisms is available and can be used alternatively or combined with 
each other as an “instrumental mix”61. The traditional prohibitory law, proto-
                                                          
57 The possibility of a “virtuous circle”, i.e. the opposite of a vicious circle, is also de-
scribed by Häfner/Kiesel/Wirthmann, Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht 2017, 299 
as well as Zülch/Kretzmann, Der Betrieb 2016, 677 (681). 
58 This idea is also suggested in the reasons for the law, Parliamentary Docu-
ment 18/9982, p. 1. 
59 See only Herdegen, Völkerrecht, 15th ed. 2016, § 26 rec. 4 et seq. 
60 Regarding the concept of regulatory choice, see Schuppert, Staatswissenschaft, 2003, 
p. 591 et seq.; see also idem., in: Müller/Schuppert, Corporate Governance im Wandel, 2011, 
p. 17 (23). 
61For details see Michael, in: Hoffmann-Riem/Schmidt-Aßmann/Voßkuhle (eds.), 
Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, Vol. II, 2nd ed. 2012, § 41. 
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typically enforced by administrative order, is but one tool among many62. 
At least in German administrative law, environmental law has established 
itself as a traditional venue for legislative and administrative creativity and is 
therefore characterized more than any other legal field by an instrumental vari-
ety and diversity63. Apart from the conventional “command-and-control” in-
struments, steering taxes with financial effects64, market-based cap-and-trade sys-
tems65, cooperative forms of action66 and information activities of authorities67 
now exist. In contrast, corporate reporting has so far not been a part of this. 
This raises the question of how this new instrument relates to the known 
forms of action of environmental law, i.e. in which compartment of environ-
mental law “toolbox” it has found its place. 
a) Non-financial reporting as a “soft” regulatory approach 
Different models for the characterization and categorization of regulato-
ry strategies are discussed in the legislative and administrative sciences. A first 
rough localization of the duty to disclose non-financial reports is made possible 
for example by a scale developed by the OECD, which groups the forms of 
state intervention in a total of eight gradations from free market to command-and-
control regulation68. This includes the category of mandatory information disclosure (to 
enhance consumer choice), which corresponds with the information-based function-
ing of non-financial reporting described in III.1. (insofar as further stakehold-
ers are added to consumers, especially investors). This is the second most lib-
eral form of intervention on the OECD scale.  
On the four-stage69 scale proposed by Hoffmann/Riem, ranging from “im-
perative government regulation” to “private self-regulation”, the reporting duty 
                                                          
62 For the background of the so-called governance approach, see for example Voßkuhle, 
Verwaltungsarchiv 92 (2001), 184 (194 et seq.); Schulze-Fielitz, in: idem (ed.), Staatsrechtslehre 
als Wissenschaft, Deutsche Verwaltung-Beiheft 7, p. 11 (43 et seq.); Bumke, in: Schmidt-
Aßmann/Hoffmann-Riem (eds.), Methoden der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft, p. 73 (103 et 
seq.). 
63 Thus, the description and systemization of the instruments of environmental law in 
Kloepfer, Umweltrecht, 4th ed. 2016, § 5, occupies no less than 1.800 paragraphs. 
64 E.g. the taxation of fossile energy carriers in accordance with the German Energy 
Tax Law. 
65 E.g. the European emissions trading scheme. 
66 E.g. remediation agreements in accordance with sec. 13 para. 4 Federal Soil Protec-
tion Act. 
67 E.g. the location register in accordance with sec. 16a para 1, 4 Law on Genetically 
Modified Organisms. 
68 Presented and commented on by Schuppert, Governance und Rechtsetzung, 2011, 
p. 128 et seq. 
69 Hoffmann-Riem, in: idem./Schmidt-Aßmann (eds.), Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht 
als wechselseitige Auffangordnungen, 1996, p. 261 (300 et seq.). 
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also appears near the liberal end, namely in the category “government induced 
self-regulation”. This is characterized by the fact that only a legal framework is 
created within which societal forces ideally achieve the desired regulatory aim 
themselves70. That is done here through the legal reporting duty, which pro-
vides an incentive system intended to motivate the undertaking in an interac-
tion with other actors to raise environmental and social standards without any 
requirements being specified by the authorities. 
This influencing effect also allows the obligation to provide non-
financial reports to be interpreted as a form of so-called nudging. This concept, 
which is inspired by behavioural economics and is currently being controver-
sially discussed, describes governance mechanisms which achieve regulatory 
goals merely through skilfully conceived stimuli and incentives without having 
to resort to orders and coercive action, which interfere to a greater extent and 
require stronger justification71. Governmental nudging does not directly restrict 
the objective freedom of the party affected, but instead provides an external 
impetus to influence the conduct of the party in its (actual or presumed)72 own 
interest73. Especially in the mind of the European Commission, according to 
which undertakings themselves benefit at least in the medium term from ef-
forts for Corporate Social Responsibility74, the enforced self-reflection by way 
of the extended reporting duty constitutes precisely such “decision-making as-
sistance”75.  
b) Non-financial reporting compared to conventional instruments of en-
vironmental law 
The classification of non-financial reporting duties as an information and 
market-based form of influencing regulation allows a systematizing comparison 
with the known instruments of environmental law, which share certain features 
                                                          
70 Detailed description and definition for example by Eifert, in: Hoffmann-
Riem/Schmidt-Aßmann/Voßkuhle (eds.), Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, Vol. I, 2nd ed. 
2012, § 19 rec. 52. 
71 Fundamentally Thaler/Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness, 2nd ed., 2009, in particular p. 74 et seq.; introduction from the perspective of 
administrative law in G. Kirchhof, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 2015, 136 et seq.; in view of the 
CSR-URG also Seibt, Der Betrieb 2016, 2707 (2708). 
72 Because of the pedagogical characteristics of the approach of nudging, Thaler/Sunstein 
themselves coined the term of “libertarian paternalism”.  
73 Examples in G. Kirchhof, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 2015, 136 (136). 
74 See III.1 above. 
75 However, whether the legislator and the administration are able and called upon to 
help private individuals and undertakings to take “better” decisions is disputed. The status of 
the discussion about “freedom and dirigisme”, see for example Smeddinck, Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik 2014, 245 (246). 
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with the duty to provide non-financial reports. The atypical guise of commer-
cial law itself does not rule out structural parallels with the form and effect of 
the established forms of action. At the same time, contrasting with other in-
struments can sharpen the eye for the characteristic features of non-financial 
reporting. 
EMAS certification 
Looking for such parallels, one first comes across the European eco-
management and audit scheme EMAS. Its current version, based on Regulation 
(EC) No. 1221/2009 (“EMAS III”)76, EMAS gives undertakings and other or-
ganizations the possibility to submit to a comprehensive monitoring and re-
porting system for environmental impacts and to have its implementation cer-
tified by an external environmental auditor. A central building block of EMAS 
is the so-called environmental statement in which the EMAS-certified organi-
sation prepares and publishes the environmentally relevant company infor-
mation (art. 4 para. 1 d EMAS III). The necessary contents also include, ac-
cording to art. 2 No. 18 EMAS III, information on environmental policies and 
environmental management systems, environmental aspects and impacts and 
on environmental programs and goals. This shows clear overlaps with the list 
in sec. 289c para. 3 HGB. The EMAS environmental statement is thus also one 
of the international frameworks referred to in the CSR Directive, CSR Guide-
lines and the CSR-RUG, which corporations can use as guidance for the prepa-
ration of their non-financial statement (art. 19a para. 4 Accounting Directive; 
point 1, 19 CSR Guidelines, sec. 289d HGB)77. 
Accordingly, the mode of action of the EMAS that is hoped for is similar 
to that of non-financial reporting: The Commission expects EMAS certifica-
tion to «encourage companies voluntarily to set up site or company-wide environmental man-
agement and audit systems that promote continuous environmental performance improve-
ments»78. EMAS can thus be considered, with respect to environmental disclo-
sures, as a model for the duty to provide non-financial reports. 
However, a closer look reveals structural differences. Foremost among 
them, the EMAS certification with the accompanying environmental statement 
                                                          
76 Regulation (EC) No. 1221/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 November 2009 allowing voluntary participation by organizations in a Community eco-
management and audit scheme and repealing regulation (EC) No. 761/2001 and Commission 
decisions 2001/681/EC and 2006/193/EC, OJ EU No. L 342, p. 1. 
77 See also Recital 9 CSR Directive and Parliamentary Document 18/9982, p. 52. 
78 Green Paper of the Commission of 18 July 2001, European framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, COM(2001) 366 final, para. 40; in depth regarding the functioning of 
“regulated self-regulation” through EMAS Leifer, Das europäische Umweltmanagementsystem 
EMAS als Element gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung, p. 85 et seq. 
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is legally entirely non-binding. The facultative EMAS certification is merely 
“rewarded” through partial deregulation, in addition to possible reputational 
gains, for example in the form of facilitations in the permit proceedings under 
emission control law in accordance with sec. 58e of the German Federal Emis-
sions Control Act. In contrast, the special feature of the non-financial report-
ing introduced through the CSR Directive consists precisely of the binding na-
ture for the undertakings within its scope of application. 
Elsewhere, the EMAS certification goes beyond the duty to provide non-
financial reports: It is not limited to the informative environmental statement 
but also sets substantive standards, for example for setting up an internal envi-
ronmental management (art. 4 para. 1  b EMAS III) and for continuous im-
provements beyond the legal minimum standard (art. 2 No. 1, art. 18 para. 2 c 
EMAS III). If an undertaking fails to satisfy these requirements, the certifica-
tion fails likewise. Reporting for the purposes of commercial law is purely in-
formation-based; from a legal point of view it is either “right” or “wrong”, but 
never inadequate in substance. 
The parallelism with the EMAS certification consequently exists primari-
ly in the form of the statement on environmental issues and in the basic ap-
proach of creating indirect incentives for environmentally friendly action (also) 
through the transparency of the environmental impacts of business activities. 
Governmental information activity  
The duty to provide non-financial reports shares its information-based 
mechanism with the various manifestations of governmental information activ-
ities. Public institutions can influence the consumption and investment behav-
iour of third parties through tips and recommendations, thereby indirectly con-
trolling and influencing the environmentally relevant conduct of undertakings. 
The recommendation when purchasing electrical devices to check their energy 
efficiency79 is intended for example to induce consumers to choose economical 
products – and inversely to motivate producers to offer more such models. 
As in the case of the non-financial statement, the persuasive effect on 
the market players here occurs only indirectly, namely through the actual or an-
ticipated reaction of third parties to the information (consumers, investors, 
other stakeholders). Binding requirements are imposed neither upon the parties 
directly addressed nor upon the parties indirectly affected80. However, a struc-
                                                          
79 Example in Kloepfer, Umweltrecht, 4th ed. 2016, § 5 rec. 1304 (footnote 1500 there). 
80 But it does not follow from this that such informative action has as a matter of prin-
ciple no intervening character. In depth with regard to the requirements of the (basic) law, in 
particular before the background of the prerogative of the law, see Schoch, Die Schwierigkeiten 
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tural difference from non-financial reporting does exist in terms of the author 
of the information. The undertakings subject to a reporting duty themselves 
provide information, albeit on the basis and within the framework of a legal 
requirement, about their major environmental impacts and the policies relating 
thereto, whereas governmental information activity is characterized by the tri-
angle consisting of the informing entity, the mediator being addressed and the 
indirect (“actual”) subject of regulation. The undertaking required to report 
therefore itself controls, within the legal framework, whether and how to take 
an influence on the content of the information by adjusting its environmental 
policies. The party exposed to governmental information activities, in contrast, 
typically has no influence on the contents of the communication. Moreover, 
the reporting duty technically follows directly from the law, whereas informa-
tive activities represent an act of administrative enforcement. 
Information and labelling duties  
The characteristic of non-financial reporting obligations that the issuer 
of the information is at the same time the subject matter of the regulation is 
shared with the governance instrument of environment-related information 
and labelling duties81. Thus, for example, the producers of certain electrical de-
vices are obliged under the German Energy Consumption Disclosure Ordi-
nance (Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsverordnung) to indicate the energy efficiency 
of their products in a standardized format. Here, too, market players are thus 
obliged to make a “self-declaration” in order to enable in particular consumers 
to make purchase decisions on the basis of environmentally relevant infor-
mation and preferences. This is entirely consistent with the fundamental mech-
anism of non-financial reporting, so that the greatest structural parallels exist 
with such environment-related information and labelling duties. 
But the crucial difference is the reference object of the information. La-
belling duties are product-related, whereas the obligatory disclosures of envi-
ronmental impacts according to secs. 289b et seq. HGB comprise the entire 
company or group required to report. This global view is immanent in the 
basic approach of Corporate Social Responsibility which understands the un-
dertaking in its entirety as a social actor82.  
The comparison with established instruments of environmental law thus 
                                                                                                                                                    
des BVerfG mit der Bewältigung staatlichen Informationshandelns, Neue Zeitschrift für Ver-
waltungsrecht2011, 193 et seq. 
81 Regarding this category in general, see for example Kloepfer, Umweltrecht, 4th 
ed. 2016, § 5 rec. 458. 
82 For this, see already II. above. 
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highlights partial commonalities, but on the whole confirms the novelty of the 
governance approach in the framework of corporate reporting in accordance 
with commercial law. The basic principle of indirect behavioural influencing 
through information is, however, well known and comprehensively re-
searched83. Therefore, in the future analysis of the legal and factual effects of 
non-financial reporting, reference will have to be made partly to the findings 
developed in the case law and the literature with regard to these related forms 
of action. A simple transfer of familiar patterns would, however, ignore the 
special features of non-financial reporting as a company-related information-
mediated and market-based governance instrument. 
 
 
4. Points of Criticism and Open Questions  
 
Whether the duty to report on environmental and social issues will prove 
to be an efficient and suitable means to enhance responsible entrepreneurial 
action will have to be observed in future reporting periods. The management 
reports already published for the fiscal year 2017 do not allow any final evalua-
tion in this respect, in particular as the dynamisation effect84 described above 
can begin to occur no earlier than in the next reporting period. It therefore re-
mains to be seen whether the desired persuasive effects will outweigh the ex-
penditures for the company-wide generation and aggregation of information, 
and whether the stakeholders will in actual fact sensibly react as expected to 
non-financial disclosures. It is therefore to be welcomed that the CSR Di-
rective provides in art. 3 for an evaluation of the results by 6 December 2018. 
At this point and at this time we will therefore only briefly discuss some 
of the aspects raised by the CSR Directive and the CSR-RUG. 
 
4. 1. Inadequate Definitiveness of the Statutory Provision 
 
According to sec. 289c para. 2, 3 no. 4 HGB, which transposes art. 19a 
para. 1 Accounting Directive into national law, a corporation subject to the du-
ty of non-financial reporting must disclose information regarding, among other 
matters, environmental issues, provided that is necessary to understand the course 
of business of the company as well as the effects of the business activities, in-
                                                          
83 For example Kloepfer, Staatliche Informationen als Lenkungsmittel, 1998, p. 14 et seq.; 
Hochhuth, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2003, 30 (30). 
84 See III. 1.b) above. 
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cluding the principal risks involved in the business activities which very probably 
have or will have serious negative effects, insofar as the information is material and 
the reports as well as the handling of these risks by the company is proportionate. 
This accumulation of vague legal terms throws doubt on the operability of the 
prohibitions. The fact that the criterion of “materiality” is a well-established 
concept in corporate reporting hardly alleviates the situation in this respect, as 
non-financial reporting concerns the materiality of the effects on matters of 
Corporate Social Responsibility and not the materiality for the course of busi-
ness of the company85. The lack of definitiveness of the provisions was thus 
also emphatically criticized in the German legislative process86. 
Especially in view of the fines and criminal penalties provided for in 
secs. 331 et seq. HGB and the rule of law principle of nulla poena sine lege (stricta) 
(art. 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 103 para. 2 of the German 
basic law), this legislative technique is questionable, even where the use of in-
determinate legal terms is not entirely avoidable in the necessary abstract de-
scription of reportable information. Certain practical guidance can be provided 
by the CSR Guidelines, which can be expected to shape the interpretation and 
application of the new provisions. However, because of their formally non-
binding nature, the CSR Guidelines cannot determine the objective normative 
content of sec. 289b et seq. HGB as well as the accessory criminal and admin-
istrative penal provisions. The CSR Guidelines even expressly point out that 
one cannot legally rely on compliance with them87. All the same, consistent ori-
entation by the CSR Guidelines should significantly minimize any risk of sanc-
tions: On the one hand, it is to be expected that the courts will also be guided 
by the interpretation offered by the Commission when they apply the law, and 
on the other hand, the bona fide observance of “official” interpretations can 
have an exonerating effect under German criminal law88. 
A further consequence of the provisions’ ambiguity should be that the 
corporations concerned will for the purpose of risk minimization also have the 
non-financial statement audited in substance, either within the framework of 
                                                          
85 As proposed, however, by Fink/Schmidt, Der Betrieb 2015, 2157 (2163); regarding the 
“change of perspective” of non-financial reporting, see also Hinze/Freidank, ZfU 2018, 21 (42) 
with further references. 
86 Statement No. 19/2016 of the German Lawyers Association on the government draft 
act to strengthen non-financial reporting by corporations in their management and group man-
agement reports, p. 11. 
87 CSR Guidelines, point 1; regarding the non-binding nature, see also Mock, Der Be-
trieb 2018, 2144 (2145 et seq.). 
88Regarding theses effects of formally non-binding statements, see Schramm, Einseitiges 
informelles Verwaltungshandeln im Regulierungsrecht, p. 109 et seq. and 106 et seq. 
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the annual financial statements by the auditor (cf. sec. 289b para. 4 HGB) or 
subsequently by order of the Supervisory Board (sec. 111 para. 2 AktG)89. 
 
4. 2. Unclear Requirements as to the “Policies” for Environmental and 
Social Issues 
 
The room for interpretation the new provision provide has another ef-
fect: As an important element of the intended persuasive effect through report-
ing, the comply-or-explain mechanism of sec. 289c para. 4 HGB was identified. 
Under this provision, a corporation within the scope of the non-financial re-
porting obligations must explain when and why it pursues no special policy for 
handling the impacts of its business activities on the environmental and social 
issues named in sec. 289c para. 2 HGB90. The CSR Directive and the CSR-
RUG do not specify what requirements a “policy” must satisfy in order to sus-
pend the duty to explain pursuant to sec. 289c para. 4 HGB. The reasons for 
the law merely state that these are «explanations regarding the goals defined by the cor-
poration in respect of a non-financial aspect, what measures it wants to take in that respect 
and the time period for this, how management is involved in these measures, and what pro-
cesses […] it wants to carry out»91. The CSR Directive simply takes the meaning of 
the term for granted and the CSR Guidelines also remain quite vague on this 
point: For example, it is said that undertakings can disclose information on 
who in their organization is responsible for monitoring a specific concept or 
on strategies for the reduction of hazardous chemicals92. 
Given the terminological openness of the CSR Directive and the CSR-
RUG, undertakings should easily be exposed to the suspicion that, in anticipa-
tion of the reporting duty, some ineffective form of process has been installed 
in order to be able to refer to a policy. Such formal “sham policies” are not in-
tended by the reporting duty93, but can hardly be prevented through the nebu-
                                                          
89 For this, see I.2.d) above. It is telling that the provision of sec. 111 para. 2 AktG was 
only subsequently inserted into the CSR-RUG as a reaction to criticism of the proposed legisla-
tion, in this respect see Kajüter, Der Betrieb 2017, 617 (624). 
90 For this, see I.2.c) above. 
91 Parliamentary Document. 18/9982, p. 49. 
92 CRS Guidelines, point 4.2. 
93 See Kajüter, Der Betrieb 2017, 617 (621), whose assessment that the development and 
adjustment of policies only for the purposes of reporting is per se contrary to the legislative in-
tention, is, however, not convincing. Where a policy is effective in terms of the minimization 
of disadvantageous impacts of the business activities, that achieves precisely the intended steer-
ing effect of the reporting duty. This fails only in case of purely formal sham policies for the 
purpose of evading the obligation to make an explanatory statement in accordance with 
sec. 289c para. 4 HGB.  
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lous term “policy”. Given this fact, the comply-or-explain may not be able to fully 
be effective as intended and of allowing “greenwashing” with little substance94.  
 
4.3. Connection of the Reporting Duty to the Business Relevance 
 
As already explained95, the core concern and the essential novelty of the 
CSR Directive and the CSR-RUG compared to the earlier reporting regime 
consists of the extension of corporate reporting to the consequences of busi-
ness activities for external environmental and social issues. In accordance with 
this objective, the list of reportable aspects named as examples in sec. 289c pa-
ra. 3 HGB mostly contains impacts of the business activities outside the corpo-
ration and only quite incidentally relates to financial reporting through the 
«most significant non-financial indicators» (No. 5) and the possibility of referring to 
«amounts disclosed in the annual financial statements» (No. 6). 
Before this backdrop, it is surprising that, according to the filter in sec. 
289c para. 3 HGB information is reportable only if that is necessary to under-
stand the course of business, the business results or the situation of the com-
pany. This relevance criterion (partly) takes up the wording of art. 19 para. 1 
subpara. 3 Accounting Directive (sec. 289 para. 3 HGB) which, however, as a 
provision regulating the management report, has as its subject matter precisely 
the performance indicators of significance to the business activities and thus 
any impacts within the undertaking96. 
The connection to the course, result and situation of the business in 
sec. 289c para. 3 HGB can therefore be understood as a concession to the tra-
ditional reporting regime. But in view of the goals of non-financial reporting 
on Corporate Social Responsibility, this restriction is not convincing: If stake-
holders of a corporation are to be enabled to gain the most complete picture 
possible of the relevant impacts of the business operations on environmental 
and social issues, then this must logically also comprise impacts which, alt-
hough significant, are not necessary to understand the course and results of the 
business or the business situation. 
Whether and to what extent undertakings will actually exclude relevant 
issues from their non-financial reporting on the ground that these are suppos-
edly not necessary to understand the course, results or situation of the business 
                                                          
94For this, Hinze/Freidank, Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht 2018, 21 (42) 
with further references. 
95 See III.1 above. 
96 Regarding the content of the management report, see I.2.c) above. 
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remains to be seen in the actual reporting practice. However, such a manner of 
proceeding should rarely be risk-free, as particularly significant environmental 
impacts will typically be relevant also to the understanding of the business, as 
already mentioned97. This, however, does not close the apparently intended gap 
in the non-financial reporting.  
 
 
5. Summary and Outlook 
 
The extension of the annual management report through the additional 
requirements introduced by the CSR Directive and the CSR-RUG, which 
comprises a non-financial statement on aspects of Corporate Social Responsi-
bility, is a novel kind of governance instrument to achieve environmental and 
social goals. The obligation of large capital market-oriented corporations to 
disclose the impacts of their business operations on matters outside the com-
pany to shareholders, customers, investors and other stakeholders is intended 
to provide an indirect incentive for “more responsible” business policies. 
Such comparably subtle instruments of indirect governance are common 
and familiar especially in the field of environmental law. However, in terms of 
its concrete form and (desired) mode of action, the reporting duty is a novelty, 
not least of all because of its incorporation into corporate law. 
The wording of the provisions of the CSR Directive and the CSR-RUG 
reveals drafting deficiencies in view of the accumulation of indeterminate legal 
terms which can at best be rudimentarily compensated for in the legal practice 
by way of the CSR Guidelines of the Commission. Moreover, the exclusion of 
impacts, the knowledge of which is not necessary to understand the course of 
business, the business results or the situation of the corporation, contradicts 
the purpose of non-financial reporting.  
Whether the desired persuasive effects can be achieved by means of cor-
porate reporting and will in particular justify the extra expenditures for the 
companies and groups concerned will transpire in the coming business years, 
in particular through a comparison of successive management reports. First 
empirical studies have so far shown greatly divergent results; only in few cases 
a detailed and transparent overview could be confirmed98. Nonetheless, the in-
novative regulatory approach deserves further observation and support, ideally 
in a fruitful dialogue between environmental and corporate law. 
                                                          
97 See I.2.c) above. 
98 Analysis of a great number of the DAX 30 undertakings first required to report (for 
the area of human rights) by Wiedmann/Greubel, Der Betriebsberater 2018, 1027, 1028. 
